Belief Formation & Belief Revision

Summary: This study examines how confirmation bias operates across information search, interpretation, and memory recall when individuals reason about controversial topics, providing empirical evidence on the persistence of biased reasoning and its implications for belief formation and revision.

Summary: This paper argues that belief is best understood as the outcome of multiple processes, including rational updating and heuristic evidence evaluation, and proposes a hierarchical framework to localize irrationality in belief formation.

Summary: This paper challenges the assumption that belief-consistent reasoning phenomena, such as biased assimilation and belief polarization, necessarily indicate motivated irrationality. It argues that the non-normativity of these processes is not well established, offering a nuanced perspective on the epistemic status of motivated reasoning.

Summary: This study tests ideological asymmetries in politically motivated reasoning and finds no evidence that one political group is more biased than the other, nor that epistemic needs for certainty drive rationalization.

Summary: This study examines how confirmation bias in reinforcement learning may benefit learners by reducing decisional and environmental noise, finding through human experiments and simulations that asymmetric learning from choice-confirming outcomes can maximize rewards when disconfirming feedback is not entirely ignored.

Summary: Shows that people are less accurate in logical reasoning when conclusions conflict with their political ideology, especially on hot-button issues, and analytical thinking helps leftists more than rightists.

Summary: This study examines whether counter-attitudinal information can alter pre-existing attitudes and associated confirmation biases in children, finding that such information reduces negative biases and shifts information-seeking patterns. The findings contribute to understanding belief revision and cognitive bias malleability.

Summary: A review of the 25-year development of the actively open-minded thinking (AOT) construct and its measurement, highlighting its strong prediction of rational performance yet paradoxical failure to reduce myside bias, shedding light on the limits of metacognitive self-awareness.

Summary: Investigates how emotional attachment to political groups (affective polarization) shapes belief in misinformation, highlighting the fusion of emotion and erroneous belief.

Summary: This study investigates how executive functions support belief revision in elementary school children, finding that making predictions enhances learning by increasing metacognitive flexibility, whereas post-hoc evaluation relies more heavily on inhibition and switching skills.

Summary: This article investigates how individuals' meta-beliefs about whether beliefs ought to change in light of evidence relate to their actual beliefs across domains such as religion, politics, and science. The findings show that endorsing an actively open-minded style toward evidence is associated with more liberal political views, greater acceptance of scientific claims, and greater skepticism toward paranormal and conspiratorial claims, underscoring the importance of meta-cognitive factors in belief formation and revision.

Summary: This paper develops a probabilistic theory of belief formation in social networks, using belief-adoption probabilities and fixed-point dynamics to model rapid local consensus and slower global diffusion, and deriving quantitative results on propaganda limits and the temporal structure of social conformity.

Summary: This study examines techniques to reduce the belief perseverance bias—the tendency to maintain biased beliefs after misinformation is retracted—by comparing counter-speech, awareness training, and counter-explanation. It finds counter-speech most effective, contributing to understanding of cognitive debiasing in the context of belief revision and misinformation.

Summary: This paper argues that a weak mechanism—the preference for belief—can produce issue polarization and echo chambers even without social or cognitive exclusion, challenging common explanations and suggesting that polarization may be more intractable than assumed.

Summary: Gibson critiques existing models of self-deception and argues that many cases are best understood as epistemic omissions, where subjects unconsciously form comforting beliefs and then fail to correct them for motivated reasons, thereby reconciling psychological plausibility with personal responsibility.

Summary: This study presents four experiments demonstrating that inducing a counterfactual mindset increases individuals' willingness to revise their beliefs and correct misinformation when confronted with contradictory evidence. The findings highlight a psychological strategy for promoting belief flexibility and reducing resistance to evidence, with implications for addressing misinformation.

Summary: This study examines the effectiveness of awareness training and counter-speech techniques, individually and in combination, for reducing belief perseverance bias after misinformation retraction. The findings demonstrate that combining these methods yields greater mitigation of persistent biased beliefs, contributing to strategies for correcting misinformation in real-world contexts.

Summary: This review synthesizes empirical research on belief from cognitive science, highlighting evidence for automatic belief fixation, fragmented storage, and dual systems of belief change, with implications for understanding how misinformation exploits cognitive processes.

Summary: This study tests the Cultural Cognition Thesis across 23 countries, finding that cultural cognition is a weak predictor of climate change beliefs, policy preferences, and actions, and that polarization is not greatest among the highly educated, challenging the view that identity-driven cognition is central to climate change thought.

Summary: This study demonstrates that the need for closure indirectly strengthens identity fusion with religious groups by fostering adherence to religious ideology, highlighting how epistemic needs for certainty shape group identification and potential conflict.

Summary: This research examines how partisan identity influences belief in and willingness to share political news, finding that both Democrats and Republicans are more likely to believe news that portrays their own group positively or the opposing group negatively, shedding light on the cognitive biases underlying political misinformation.

Summary: This paper argues that the motivated reasoning approach explains why people prefer health-related misinformation, driven by directional goals that foster confirmation and disconfirmation biases to protect existing beliefs and identities, highlighting the psychological mechanisms behind resistance to accurate health information.

Summary: This study uses fMRI to examine the neural mechanisms underlying politically motivated reasoning, identifying distinct brain networks for desirability bias (value-encoding, error detection, mentalizing) and identity bias (mentalizing). It demonstrates that both biases are driven by similar neural processes across opposing ideological groups, contributing to understanding belief polarization and biased information processing.